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The EU budget and UK contribution 
Iain Begg, European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science 
The European Union budget is small and fulfils only a limited range of functions, yet it provokes 
regular disputes among the member states and institutions of the Union. This paper describes the 
structure of the budget and shows that standard theories, such as fiscal federalism, are not well-
suited to analysing how the EU budget operates or the political economy behind it. The paper then 
looks at how much the UK contributes towards the EU budget and explains why some of the claims 
made about it in the public discourse are inaccurate. 
Keywords: European Union budget; fiscal federalism; UK referendum on EU; EU cohesion policy; 
common agricultural policy; own resources 
JEL Classifications: F55, H11, H61 
One of the most consistently contentious aspects of the European Union is its budget. This is a 
puzzle, not least because the budget accounts for barely 2 percentage points of aggregate public 
expenditure by all levels of government. The issues that cause friction turn on fractions of a 
percentage point of the GDP of Member States and would probably generate far less acrimony if 
they arose inside a country. Disputes centre on the size of the budget, the net contributions or 
receipts of different Member States, the composition of spending and the manner in which the 
budget is funded. During the 1980s, there was intense conflict between the EU institutions over who 
should have the final say on the budget (Laffan, 1997). Although the significant reforms in 1988 saw 
a diminution in these conflicts, they have not gone away. 
Since 1988, limited changes in the presentation and composition of the budget have been 
undertaken. The total budget expenditure has been around one percent of EU GDP on average, 
reflecting the fact that that for the principal net contributors (notably Germany and the UK) keeping 
the budget low has been a priority. Since it has to be agreed by unanimity among the Member 
States, they have been able to achieve this aim. Within this total, around three-quarters of the 
spending has been devoted to two principal policy areas: Cohesion Policy, targeted at economic, 
social and (more recently) territorial development; and support for agriculture and rural 
development. All other headings of the budget have had to compete for the remaining quarter. Over 
these three decades, the main change in the budget has been for the share of Cohesion Policy to 
rise, while that of agriculture has fallen (figure 1).  
The EU budget also elicits regular hostile comment. It fails, year after year, to obtain a statement of 
assurance from the European Court of Auditors that the money had been properly spent, an 
outcome that is mainly the result of errors in conforming to the complex rules governing spending, 
rather than overt fraud. Brussels ‘fat cats’ are frequently castigated for their extravagance, high pay 
and perks, even though the administrative share of the budget was around 6% in 2015, and much of 
that is to pay for the costs of translation and interpretation. 
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Figure 1, Shares of the EU budget, 1988-2014 
 
Source: EU Financial Reports, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 
 Since the budget was recast in 1988, there have been substantial changes in the EU itself. The euro 
has been introduced and there have been four enlargements of the EU’s membership (in 1995, 
2004, 2007 and 2014), taking the number of Member States from twelve to twenty-eight, greatly 
increasing the disparities in GDP per head within the EU. As Buti and Nava (2009: 478) note, ‘the 
weight of the past both in terms of expenditure, revenues and budgetary procedure has tended to 
prevail, leading over time to an increasingly suboptimal distribution of tasks between the EU and the 
national level’. Time after time, political constraints have inhibited reform (Heinemann et al. 2010). 
Although successive UK governments have grumbled about the costs of the EU budget, it did not 
feature in the ‘renegotiation’. However, it is one of the higher profile issues around the Brexit 
debate, with claims and counter-claims about how much the UK ‘sends to Brussels’, and frequent 
assertions about how the same money could be better used at home, whether for flood defences, 
hospital building, recruitment of more nurses or other preferred options of critics. A reason for this 
is that there are many ways of presenting key measures, such as how much it costs or who gains 
from it, allowing protagonists on different sides of the debate to seize on particular indicators to 
support their case. Often, however, an opposite case can be constructed just as convincingly by 
using a different mix of figures, leading to confusion about the true position. 
The aim of this paper is to explain the rationale for, and purpose of, the EU budget and to convert 
some of the heat in the debate on it into light. It looks in particular at the various interpretations of 
the cost to the UK. The next section considers how the budget fits into the wider framework of 
public finance in the EU, notably through the lens of fiscal federalism. The following section focuses 
on the UK and some of the contentious issue that the budget evokes, then conclusions complete the 
paper. 
The EU budget in the public finance framework 
Many standard theories, whether rooted in public economics, political science or European 
integration studies, struggle to offer a convincing story about the development of the budget or how 
it might be expected to evolve. In the standard ‘Musgravian’ schema, a distinction is made between 
the stabilisation, allocation and redistribution functions of public finances (Musgrave, 1959). Where 
there are multiple tiers of government, fiscal federalism offers a potential framework for 
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determining which tier should be primarily responsible for undertaking each function. Substantial 
cross-border externalities or opportunities for economies of scale or scope are usually adduced as 
reasons to assign budgetary competence to higher tiers, while diversity in preferences justify 
pushing competence downwards. 
However, when confronted with the current EU budget, the theory falls at the first hurdle because 
the presumption is that the centre – even in a substantially devolved polity such as Switzerland 
(McKay, 2001) – has revenues and functions that it is logical to assign to it. Quite simply, the EU 
budget does not provide the mix of public goods normally associated with the highest tier of 
government or consistent with tests of subsidiarity such as that developed by Ecorys (2008).  
Although there was a limited attempt to accelerate some EU spending as part of the fiscal stimulus 
package launched by the G20 in 2009, the scope for using the EU budget for macroeconomic 
stabilisation purposes is negligible. By Article 310 on the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) It is required to balance the budget each year, precluding the operation of automatic 
stabilisers, and because the budget is small, cannot really make a visible macroeconomic impact. In a 
study published some forty years ago, MacDougall (1977) set out the magnitudes that would be 
needed to fulfil different functions in this regard, suggesting that for an economic and monetary 
union, it should be 5-7% of GDP to be able to contribute to macroeconomic stabilisation. Having 
been stuck at around just one percentage point of GDP since 1988 and with hawk-eyed negotiators 
from the net contributor countries able to block any proposals to increase this amount, a 
stabilisation function can be excluded for the foreseeable future. There have been calls as part of the 
reform of Eurozone economic governance for some additional fiscal capacity, but these lack 
sufficient report and did not feature in the Five Presidents’ Report, the most recent blueprint for 
completing EMU (Juncker et al., 2015). 
Allocation or redistribution: an unresolved mystery?  
This leaves allocation and redistribution, yet the rationale for having an EU budget can be hard to 
discern. There clearly has to be provision for the administrative costs of running the EU, including 
the various institutions of governance that have been put in place over the years. There are also 
spending programmes that reflect treaty obligations, although their size and scope are not dictated 
by the treaty. Thus, the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) is provided for in Part 3, Title III of the 
TFEU, with Article 40 stating that ‘to attain its objectives, one or more agricultural guidance and 
guarantee funds may be set up’. Title XVIII, similarly, covers Cohesion Policy, with Article 175 
referring to the various Structural Funds and the ‘financial instruments’ – code for loans, notably 
from the European Investment Bank – to be used to attain cohesion objectives. 
The stated objectives behind the CAP and Cohesion Policy are a mix of allocation and redistribution. 
Five objectives are set out for the CAP: raising productivity in the sector; boosting the income of 
farmers; stabilising markets; assuring food supply; and ensuring that consumers are supplied at 
reasonable prices. The Treaty states in Article 176= that the purpose of the European Regional 
Development Fund is to ‘redress the main regional imbalances’. In its most recent iteration, as 
described in the 6th Cohesion Report (Commission, 2014: xxi), Cohesion Policy has been ‘refocused 
on delivering an investment policy’. This extends the approach, already apparent in the 2007-13 
planning period of associating the policy with the EU’s overarching growth strategy, now embodied 
in the Europe 2020 strategy (previously, the Lisbon strategy). 
4 | P a g e  
 
In principle, the productivity, market structuring and food security elements of the CAP, as well as 
the investment orientation of Cohesion Policy, are allocative objectives. Yet many commentators on 
the EU budget take the view that these policies are redistributive – Tabellini (2003: 93) puts it 
succinctly: ‘currently the EU budget is mainly devoted to finance the redistributive programs of the 
EU’. There has also long been a view that these policies are side-payments designed to buy the 
acquiescence of beneficiaries to market integration.  
Tabellini (2003: 89) justifies his stance by asserting that Cohesion Policy seeks ‘not to increase 
economic efficiency, but to redistribute the benefits of integration among countries. Two 
redistributive purposes were prominent: to provide side payments so as to facilitate compromise in 
bargaining situations, and to achieve some redistribution from rich to poor countries or regions’. He 
also questions why the basis for this redistribution should be regional, rather than to other potential 
targets, such as poor urban areas, suggesting the EU has little legitimacy to choose which citizens 
should benefit. He further argues that the thrust of recent reforms, by moving the CAP away from 
market distorting price support towards income support, undermines the rationale for it to be an EU 
level policy. 
Several studies have sought to explain the distribution of EU spending among the Member States, 
typically focusing on variables such as voting power or relative prosperity. Unsurprisingly, given the 
unanimity needed to strike the septennial MFF deals, Akzoy (2010) finds that smaller countries, 
which are relatively over-represented in both the European Parliament and the Council, obtain 
higher shares of EU spending than would be predicted. De la Fuente et al. (2010: 222) argue that 
‘that conflict among member states over the distribution of net financial burdens has been allowed 
to condition the design of the entire European budget’. 
EU revenue 
Most of the revenue that funds the EU budget comes from what are known as ‘own resources’ 
which are designated income flows that have been assigned for this purpose (Begg, 2011). What are 
known as ‘traditional’ own resources (ToR) consist predominantly of customs duties charged on 
imports from outside the EU, topped up by some additional levies on certain agricultural imports. 
Although ToR revenues ‘belong’ to the EU level, they are collected by Member States who are 
allowed to keep 25% of the proceeds as a collection fee. They are complemented by what are 
described in the EU’s accounts as ‘national contributions’. The latter comprise a share of the 
proceeds from each Member State’s value-added tax (VAT) and an amount linked to the GNI of the 
country.  
The VAT calculation is adjusted to take account of differences in the coverage of the tax - in the UK, 
for example, VAT is not charged on food and children’s clothing. The principle behind the GNI 
resource is that each country should pay much the same proportion of its national income, although 
as explained below, there are then ‘corrections’ intended to adjust for inequities in the system.. 
Unlike most income tax systems in Member States, is not progressive in the sense of charging a 
higher rate to the better-off. That said, the bigger the country’s GNI, the more it pays towards the 
EU. The legal basis for own resources is established every few years in an agreement known as the 
Own Resources Decision which is taken unanimously by the Council of Ministers, after consultation 
of the European Parliament. The fact that the Parliament is only consulted, in contrast to its co-
decision role in expenditure, means that the revenue raising is essentially an inter-governmental 
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deal. A small proportion of the EU’s revenue comes from other sources, including the fines on 
companies, such as Microsoft, which have been found to have breached EU competition rules. 
The yield from the ToR has declined over the years, largely as a result of customs duties being 
reduced through multilateral trade deals and other bilateral trade agreements between the EU and 
other countries. Similarly, what is known as the take-up rate for the VAT resource has been reduced. 
As a result the two national contributions, especially the GNI resource, have become the main 
component of the EU’s revenue. In 2014, as figure 2 shows, the share of the GNI resource was over 
two-thirds. 
In successive rounds of MFF negotiations, dating back to 1988, attempts have been made by the 
European Commission, usually with support from the European Parliament, to assign particular taxes 
to the EU. However, despite extensive efforts to identify and justify suitable new own resources, the 
Member States have consistently rejected these initiatives on the grounds that tax setting is a power 
reserved to them. In practice, the EU has only pretty limited powers in relation to harmonisation of 
value-added tax designed to prevent distortion of competition, but has little influence other indirect 
taxes and none on direct taxes. 
The manner in which GNI figures are compiled can affect demands on individual countries. When the 
change is substantial, it can give rise to recalibration of amounts due in a way that becomes 
politically delicate. The definition of GNI is laid down in standards agreed periodically by the 
statistical offices of EU Member States in conjunction with Eurostat, the EU level authority, and 
encapsulated in the European System of Accounts (ESA). Given that the ESA is revised only every few 
years, methodological changes can introduce sizeable shifts in measured prosperity and mean that 
Member States’ relative position within the EU, and thus the amount they are charged under the 
proportion of GNI principle, can shift noticeably.  
Figure 2  EU revenue shares 2014 
 
Source: EU Financial Report 2014 
Traditional OR 
11% 
VAT resource 
12% 
GNI resource 
69% 
Other income 
8% 
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Individual countries can also revise their procedures for calculating national accounts from time to 
time, also potentially resulting in sudden jumps in the levels of GNI or GDP. A famous incident was in 
the 1980s when Italy developed a new approach to measuring its hidden economy, resulting in a big 
overnight increase in Italian GDP, taking it above that of the UK. At the time, it was described as ‘il 
sorpasso’ – the overtaking – eliciting the acerbic comment from Margaret Thatcher that she was 
unconcerned because it meant that Italy would have to pay more towards the EU budget.  
There are three principal conflicts on revenue side of the budget: over its size; over the mix of 
revenue streams used to fund it; and over the net fiscal burdens on individual Member States. 
Because national contributions dominate, the decisions on who should pay for Europe are a by-
product of national accommodations on taxation. As a consequence, the median tax-payer in one 
Member State may differ substantially from counterparts in another, such that there is no easy 
connection between the individual tax-payer and the spending authority. Indeed, it could be argued 
that the tax-payer in the EU context is the Member State with the result that accountability to tax-
payers is oblique. 
One of the explanations for the sharp focus on net budgetary positions in the political economy of 
the EU budget, according to Kauppi and Widgrén (2009), is that the Member States dominate the 
decision-making process. Because they tend to be more interested in securing the most favourable 
net position than on ensuring that what the EU spends money on is in the common interest, games 
are played which result in outcomes which pay little heed to what conceptual models of a multi-
tiered public finances suggest ought to be spent at EU level. Moreover, the unanimity rule for 
agreeing the budget among the Member States and the implied veto wielded by even the smallest, 
very much favours the status quo. 
The UK contribution 
In principle, the amounts paid into the EU’s finances from each Member State should be very similar 
as a proportion of gross national income. Since roughly one percent of EU GNI is required to pay for 
the various EU spending programmes, the starting assumption would be that the imposition on each 
Member State should also be one percent of GNI. In published tables this amount is presented as 
the ‘gross contribution’, a hypothetical amount of what they should pay if they were to contribute 
pro rata to the EU’s income.  
However, for a variety of reasons, this is not necessarily what they actually pay – and thus what their 
national treasuries have to transfer to Brussels. The most important reason is that the UK ‘rebate’ 
agreed in 1984 to placate Margaret Thatcher’s demand ‘I want my money back’ means that the 
gross contribution of all twenty-eight Member States is adjusted. That of the UK is reduced and that 
of the other twenty-seven is increased, to pay for the UK cut.  
But that is not the end of the story because, since the rebate was first agreed, Germany (which, in 
the mid-1980s, was the only other country that paid more in to the budget than it received from it) 
has only had to pay a fraction of its hypothetical share towards it. Certain other countries have also 
since had their contributions towards the UK rebate cut because they too had become substantial 
net contributors to the EU budget. This ‘rebate on the rebate’ means that the remaining countries – 
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including France where grumbling about le cheque britannique rivals UK antagonism to the CAP – 
have to pay proportionally more. 
As originally designed in 1984, the UK rebate is calculated by, first, comparing the ex-ante amount 
the UK is expected to pay into the budget and the EU public spending in the UK. Two thirds of the 
difference is then deducted from what the UK would otherwise pay and is deducted from the gross 
payment in the following year. A concession made in 2005, when the UK was negotiating the 2007-
13 MFF, meant that additional Cohesion Policy spending going to the countries of central and 
eastern Europe was excluded from the rebate calculations, resulting in a lower proportional rebate 
than previously. 
As figure 3 shows, since 1973, the UK has always paid less than Germany, which would be expected 
since Germany is a larger economy, but since the rebate was introduced in 1985, has also 
consistently paid less than France – a similar sized economy – usually by quite a large margin. 
Moreover, despite the stagnation of the Italian economy since the 1990s (it is the same size today as 
it was in 1999 and il sorpasso has long since been undone), Italy has more often than not paid more 
into the EU budget than the UK, especially since 2000. 
Figure 3   Payments into EU by four largest Member States, 1973-2014 (current prices) 
 
Source: EU Financial Reports, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 
As a result of reforms to some EU programmes, notably the CAP, countries like the Netherlands 
switched over the years from being net beneficiaries from the EU budget to net contributors, to such 
a degree that they too demanded their money back, They, along with the Austria, Sweden and (most 
recently) Denmark were accorded other sorts of ‘correction’, with the result that (along with the UK 
and Germany) several of the richer Member States have their ex-ante contributions reduced.  
How large is the UK contribution? 
As one of the largest economies in the EU it is no surprise that the UK is one of the countries asked 
to pay most towards the EU budget, and the cost of this to the British tax-payer is manifestly one of 
the contentious issues around UK membership of the EU. The contribution can be measured in a 
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number of different ways, potentially adding to the confusion. As explained above, one possible 
measure is the hypothetical gross contribution based on requiring each Member State to pay in 
proportion to its prosperity, as measured by gross national income. However, because of the UK’s 
rebate and the various other corrections what might be called the actual contributions differ from 
these ex-ante gross contributions. To reiterate, the money that national treasuries are obliged to 
send to Brussels every month is derived from these post-correction actual contributions.  
A third concept is the net contribution which is a measure of the difference between what a country 
pays-in and what it receives from EU spending programmes, especially the CAP and Cohesion Policy. 
Because the UK has a relatively small farming sector and few regions eligible for the most intensive 
levels of regional development support, the UK’s share of EU spending has always been small as a 
proportion of GNI, explaining why the UK has always been a net contributor to the EU budget. 
In what follows, the data presented refer only to the actual payments the UK makes to the EU 
budget, in other words the debits that would show on the Treasury’s bank account if we could 
examine them. As recently confirmed to the author by both the UK Treasury and the Directorate-
General for the Budget of the European Commission, this is the correct figure for what the UK pays 
and is always below the hypothetical gross contribution by the amount of the rebate. Figure 4 shows 
that the actual payments towards the own resources of the EU by each Member State in 2014 
ranged from 0.65% of GNI for the UK to 1.3% for Belgium.  
Figure 4 Contributions by Member States to EU own resources, % of national GNI, 2014 
 
Source: EU Financial Reports, 2014 
It is easy to be misled because of the way EU budget data are presented in official documents. Thus, 
in its annual publication on the UK’s national accounts (the ‘Blue Book’), the Office for National 
Statistics (ONS) separates credits from debits. Rather quaintly, the relevant table refers to the 
Fontainebleau adjustment – shown in the publications as data series FKKL – derived from the fact 
that the rebate was agreed in that town in 1984. Separate entries in the table show the amounts 
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due under each of the EU own resources in each year, summing up to a figure for ‘total identified UK 
uses’ (data series GCSM). 
The Treasury, in its regular reports on European Union Finances, always publishes a table showing 
the notional gross contribution, the rebate, the public sector receipts and the net contribution. Yet 
another complication is that the UK fiscal year runs from April to April, whereas the EU fiscal year 
(and that of most countries) is calendar years. This means that any budget presented by the 
Chancellor cuts across two EU fiscal years. Table 1, reproduced from the most recent Treasury 
report, published in December 2015, shows these data (HM Treasury, 2015).  
These Treasury figures are close to, but not identical to, the series published by the ONS. It is also 
important to note that the ‘public sector receipts’, which are deducted to arrive at the net 
contribution, do not include other EU spending in the UK which goes directly to the private sector. 
This excludes, for example, grants from the EU to companies or the income going directly to UK 
Universities to fund research. This, too, can cause confusion.  
Table 1 UK Treasury figures on the UK contributions to the EU budget 
 
Source: HM Treasury (2015) 
As the Treasury report explains it [paragraph 3.6], the majority of the public sector receipts ‘will 
either be paid to, or used in support of, the private sector but are channelled through government 
departments or agencies’. The report goes on to explain [paragraph 3.7] that ‘the EU makes some 
payments directly to the private sector, for example to carry out research activities. These payments 
do not appear in the public sector’s accounts. It is estimated that in 2013, these receipts were worth 
£1.4 billion’.  
The upshot is that while there are firm figures from UK statistical sources for the public sector’s 
transactions with the EU, there is only an estimate for the additional flow of cash from the EU 
budget to the UK. A figure for this wider definition of the net contribution can be constructed from 
the data compiled by European Commission, showing that the UK net contribution is smaller, in 
general, than implied by the Treasury data. Based on the data from the Treasury table shown above, 
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the actual contribution in 2014 (often presented in the public debate as what the UK ‘sends to 
Brussels’) was £18,777 million less the rebate of £4,416 million; that is £14,361 million, equivalent to 
£276 million per week. The net contribution, taking account of the estimated £1.4 billion of 
‘Brussels’ spending accruing directly to private agents is the Treasury figure of £9,785 million less 
£1,400 million; that is £8,385 million. 
A €2 billion Euro demand 
An illustration of how the dry statistical methodology behind the GNI contribution can erupt into a 
political dispute arose in 2014 when the UK was confronted with a demand to pay an extra €2 billion 
euros into the EU budget. The explanation was obscure, but purely technical: some countries, 
notably Germany, had already adopted certain changes in the GNI methodology (reported 
colourfully, if not entirely accurately, as taking into account earnings from prostitution) while other 
had not, including the UK. Because the changes in question meant revisions going back a number of 
years, their effect was to raise the nominal level of UK GNI in each of these years, the UK became 
liable for a much larger amount than in previous such GNI adjustments. Part of the demand was for 
2014, the rest a recalibration of what the UK should have paid in previous years. 
Cue splenetic reactions from the Prime Minister: ‘if people think I am paying that bill on 1 December, 
they have another think coming’, though less so from the Treasury which almost certainly knew well 
in advance that the demand was in the pipeline and may, dare it be said, have neglected to brief 
ministers adequately. The issue provoked so much indignation in the UK that a compromise was 
found under which the UK would pay half in the current year and half in the subsequent fiscal year. 
In the end, despite veiled suggestions to the contrary from Ministers, the amount due was also 
halved, in line with the standard functioning of the UK rebate. David Cameron lived up to his 
promise to the extent that he paid later than December 1st and the bill was not as high as the 
headlines signalled, but despite the rhetoric, pay he did.   
UK contribution in perspective 
In assessing whether what the UK pays towards is fair and appropriate, there are many possible 
answers. Whether to use the actual payment to the EU or one of the net contribution figures 
depends largely on the purpose for which the ratio is being used. If the question is how much the EU 
costs each of us (on average) per year, week or day, it is arguably best to use the actual payment, 
since this is the total amount charged to UK tax-payers. Using the £14.7 billion ONS figure (rather 
than the marginally lower Treasury figure)  and the estimated UK population of 64.35 million, the 
answer is that in 2014, the EU cost each of us £228.44, translating into £4.40 per week. The Treasury 
preference is, however, to use the public sector only version of the net contribution. This measures 
the flow of UK taxpayer money to recipients outside the UK, deducting public sector flows that 
return from the ‘Brussels’ to be distributed via the UK public sector, principally, again, for 
agricultural subsidies and cohesion policy. 
If, instead, the focus of interest is the net flows from the perspective of the balance of payments, 
what should be measured is the difference between the amount paid by UK tax-payers and all the 
receipts from the EU. This is less readily measureable in UK budgetary accounts because a 
proportion of the receipts from EU programmes goes directly to recipients, rather than through UK 
public agencies. From a distributive perspective, it is also worth noting that UK recipients of money 
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from the EU budget are not median voters or tax-payers, but highly selective groups, such as farmers 
or people in areas benefitting from cohesion policy spending. 
Half a trillion pounds? 
One of the more dramatic claims about the UK contribution to the EU budget, attracting headlines in 
several newspapers, is that since acceding to the EU in 1973, the cumulative amount exceeds half a 
trillion pounds. It is explained in a paper published by the Vote Leave campaign1 which had 
calculated how much the UK had paid into the EU budget since joining in 1973, using the technique 
of inflating the cash payments from earlier years to 2014 prices, then aggregating the 43 years of 
payments. Thus, the UK paid £187 million to the EU in 1973, but between 1973 and 2014, prices in 
the UK rose nearly tenfold, so that at 2014 prices the 1973 payment is equivalent to £1.86 billion. 
The problem with the Vote Leave calculation is that it overlooks the rebate. As explained above, the 
actual payment the UK makes always has the rebate deducted which means that the gross 
contribution data on which the headline figure is based greatly exaggerates what UK taxpayers have 
actually ‘sent to Brussels’. In the paper, the GDP deflator published by the Office of National 
Statistics is used to inflate the UK contributions from earlier years. To arrive at an accurate figure, 
the same deflators have been used to calculate the value at 2014 prices of the rebates received in 
the thirty years from its introduction in 1985 up to 2014. These total £108.9 billion at 2014 prices 
and mean the figure quoted exaggerates the true figure by some 29%. 
Concluding comments 
The EU budget cannot sensibly be compared with federal budgets in other polities, because it does 
not fulfil ‘Musgravian’ functions that are routinely assigned to the highest level of governance, 
making it hard to analyse using established concepts and theories (Begg, 2009). Equally, it is broader 
in scope than the budgets of other international organisations or agencies and is clearly more 
politicised. It is probably best thought of as a special purpose budget, intended to fund a number of 
specific expenditure programmes, but not to have a wider role in economic governance. Instead, its 
role is the largely political one of facilitating the give and take at European level, both in relation to 
objectives set out in the treaty (notably the two dominant spending programmes) and more 
implicitly on the extent of net fiscal transfers.  
Given, the plethora of concepts and measures, it is little wonder in the debate around Brexit that 
many different interpretations can be put on the gross and net UK flows to and from the EU budget. 
It is alarmingly easy to present the same basic data as either an unreasonable burden or a 
comparatively trivial cost to the tax-payer which yields considerably greater benefits. There is 
nevertheless a tendency to mix up data that concern different issues. For example, the retort to the 
half a trillion pounds claim by Vote Leave from its rival, Britain Stronger in Europe, is that the average 
UK household is £3,000 per year better off through belonging to the EU. This may or may not be a 
well-founded statistic, but it is derived from an assessment that includes the effects of lower prices 
attributable to the more competitive business environment of the single market and various 
                                                          
1
 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/voteleave/pages/214/attachments/original/1451513263/VLBudgetN
ote.pdf?1451513263  
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influences on economic growth. These other variables have nothing directly to do with the EU 
budget – in other words, apples are being compared with oranges. 
In assessing the UK contributions to the EU’s finances, there are interpretations which are 
reasonable and those which are ‘spun’ to make political points, even though they are – bluntly – an 
abuse of statistics. A normative judgement about whether what the UK’s contributes (however 
measured) to the EU budget could be better spent on other public projects or whether the 
‘membership fee’ yields sufficient benefits to be justified is beyond the scope of this paper. But the 
evidence is clear that, although it is a net contributor to an extent comparable with several other 
Member States of a similar level of prosperity, the UK does not face an unfair share of the burden of 
the gross costs of paying for Europe.  
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